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Abstract. This paper identifies certain privacy threats that apply to
anonymous credential systems. The focus is on timing attacks that apply
even if the system is cryptographically secure. The paper provides some
simple heuristics that aim to mitigate the exposure to the threats and
identifies directions for further research.
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1 Introduction
Credential systems allow subjects to prove possession of attributes to interested
parties. In a sound credential system subjects first need to obtain a structure
termed a credential from an entity termed the credential issuer. The issuer en-
codes some well-defined set of attributes together with their values into the
credential which is then passed on, or ‘granted’, to the subject. Only after hav-
ing gone through this process can the subject prove possession of those (and
only those) attributes that are encoded in the credential. During this latter pro-
cess, the interested party is said to ‘verify the credential’ and is therefore called
a verifier. Subjects are typically human users, issuers are typically well-known
organisations with authority over the attributes they encode into the credentials
they issue, and verifiers typically are service providers that perform attribute-
based access control.
An example of a credential system is a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). In a
PKI, credentials are public key certificates that bind together subject attributes
such as subject name, public key, its issue and expiry dates, and so on. The cre-
dential issuer is the Certification Authority (CA); it grants public key certificates
according to some subject registration procedure. Finally, credential verifiers are
the entities within the PKI that accept the certificates issued by the CA.
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2In conventional credential systems (e.g. a PKI), issuers and verifiers identify
any given subject by a system-wide identifier. This has a potentially severe im-
pact on the subject’s privacy, as it enables issuers and verifiers to combine their
knowledge about the subject. Indeed, they can construct individual transaction
histories for all the subjects in the system, simply by correlating credential-
related events using these identifiers.
Over the last 20 years, a significant amount of research has been performed
on credential systems that try to address the above privacy issue (see, for exam-
ple, [2–4, 6–8, 10, 11]). These systems are known as anonymous credential sys-
tems. In an anonymous credential system, subjects establish a different identi-
fier with each issuer and verifier they wish to interact with, where we assume
throughout that these pseudonyms cannot be connected to the subject’s true
identity. These identifiers, termed the subject’s pseudonyms, are unlinkable, i.e.
they do not possess any connection with one another. This means that it is in-
feasible, for colluding issuers and verifiers, to decide with certainty whether or
not any given pair of pseudonyms belongs to the same subject1. While a subject
obtains a credential under the pseudonym that was established with the issuer,
proof of its possession2 takes place under the pseudonym established with the
verifier. Of course, in order for the system to remain sound, subjects should only
be able to successfully prove possession of credentials that they were indeed
issued by some legitimate issuer.
In this paper, we consider practical limits to the level of pseudonym unlink-
ability (and, thus, subject privacy) offered by anonymous credential systems.
In particular, assuming the soundness and security of such a system, we con-
sider how timing attacks, launched by colluding issuers and verifiers, may affect
pseudonym unlinkability. Finally, we outline possible pragmatic approaches to
minimising exposure to such attacks.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section outlines the assumptions
we make about anonymous credential systems, section 3 discusses the issue of
encoding freshness into credentials and section 4 presents the timing attacks.
Section 5 provides some simple heuristics to counter the attacks and section 6
concludes, giving directions for further research.
2 A general model for anonymous credential systems
A number of anonymous credential systems have been proposed in the literature,
each with its own particular set of entities, underlying problems, assumptions
and properties. This section presents the model of anonymous credential systems
on which the rest of the paper is based. It is intended to be as general as possible,
in order to be consistent with the majority of existing schemes.
1 Assuming that at least two subjects exist within the system.
2 Proving possession of a credential amounts to proving possession of the attributes
that are encoded within the credential. We refer to this process also as the showing
of a credential.
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subjects, issuers and verifiers. We refer to issuers and verifiers, collectively, as
‘organisations’. It is assumed that subjects establish at least one pseudonym
with each organisation with which they wish to interact. These pseudonyms are
assumed to be indistinguishable, meaning that they do not bear any connection
to the identity of the subject they belong to. We further assume that pseudonyms
are unlinkable, i.e. two pseudonyms for the same subject cannot be linked to
each other. Subjects may obtain credentials, i.e. structures that encode a well-
defined, finite set of attributes together with their values, from issuers. They
may subsequently show those credentials to verifiers, i.e. convince them that
they possess (possibly a subset of) the encoded attributes. A credential is issued
under a pseudonym that the subject has established with its issuer, and it is
shown under the pseudonym that the subject has established with the relevant
verifier.
It is assumed that the anonymous credential system is sound. This means that
it offers pseudonym owner protection, i.e. that only the subject that established a
given pseudonym can show credentials under it. Soundness also implies credential
unforgeability ; the only way that subjects may prove possession of a credential is
by having obtained it previously from a legitimate issuer. In some applications,
it is required that the system offers the stronger property of credential non-
transferability. This property guarantees that no subject can prove possession
of a credential that it has not been issued, even if the subject colludes with
other subject(s) that may have (legitimately) obtained such a credential. In
other words, a system that offers non-transferability prohibits credential sharing,
whereas a system that offers only unforgeability, does not. (Of course, the degree
of protection against credential sharing is always limited, since if one subject
gives all its secrets to another subject then the latter subject will always be able
to impersonate the former and use its credentials.) We require that credentials
are bound to the subject to which they have been issued. We therefore assume
that either the system offers non-transferability or that in practice subjects do
not share their credentials.
It is assumed further that the system properly protects privacy in that a
subject’s transactions with organisations do not compromise the unlinkability of
its pseudonyms. We note, however, that this unlinkability can only be guaran-
teed up to a certain point, as credential types potentially reveal links between
pseudonyms. The type of a credential is defined as the collection of attribute val-
ues that are encoded into the credential. An organisation, for example, that issues
demographic credentials containing the fields sex and age group, with possible
values of {male,female} and {18-,18-30,30-50,50+} respectively, may actu-
ally issue up to 8 different types of credential (one for each combination of val-
ues). To see how credential types can be exploited to link subject’s pseudonyms,
consider the following trivial scenario. At time τ , a credential of type t is shown
under the pseudonym p. However, suppose that up to time τ , only one cre-
dential of type t has been issued, and this was done under pseudonym p′. It
follows, under the assumption that credentials are bound to subjects, that the
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can successfully link those two pseudonyms.
We note that, as part of credential showing, some anonymous credential
systems allow subjects to reveal only a subset of the encoded attributes; in the
above example it may be possible for the subject to reveal only the value of
sex. For these systems, it is tempting to define the type of a credential as the
collection of attributes that is revealed to the verifier during showing. However,
we restrict our attention to the scenario where the verifier, rather than the
subject, selects the attributes to be revealed during credential showing. This is,
as far as our analysis is concerned, equivalent to the case where only the required
set of attributes is encoded into a credential in the first place. This scenario is
also likely to be valid for the case where verifiers perform attribute-based access
control.
3 Encoding freshness into credentials
In certain applications, typically those involving short-lived credentials, verifiers
need to validate the freshness of credentials. Thus, some indication of freshness
has to be encoded into the credentials by their issuers. However, this indication
constitutes an additional attribute, and its value helps determine the type of
the credential. If the indication of freshness is unique for each credential (such
as a serial number, a counter value, or a nonce), then it becomes trivial for
organisations to link pseudonyms, as every credential will have its own, unique,
type. It is thus desirable, from a privacy perspective, that the indication of
freshness is shared among as many credentials as possible. One possible freshness
indication is a timestamp generated using a universal clock, with a sufficiently
coarse accuracy. We thus henceforth assume that one of the attributes that is
present in all credentials is such a timestamp.
A question that arises in this context is who decides whether or not a creden-
tial has expired. If it is the issuer, it seems more appropriate for the timestamp
to indicate the time of expiry. If, on the other hand, it is the verifier, then it
makes more sense for the timestamp to indicate the time of issue. Since the latter
alternative enables verifiers to have individual policies with respect to expiry of
credentials, in the sequel we assume that the timestamp indicates the time of
credential issue3. With τi denoting the time interval at which the timestamp is
being refreshed by the issuer (and without loss of generality), we assume that all
credentials issued between time τ and τ + τi will carry the timestamp τ . More
generally, credentials issued between nτi and (n + 1)τi are assumed to carry
the timestamp nτi (with n ≥ 0 being some non-negative integer indicating the
current period).
3 We do not consider the case where two timestamps are encoded into the credential,
indicating both the beginning and the end of its validity period.
54 Timing attacks
We consider some attacks that may be launched by colluding organisations who
wish to link pseudonyms that belong to the same subject. It is sufficient for the
organisations to link the events of credential issuing and showing as correspond-
ing to the same subject; this amounts to linking the pseudonyms that correspond
to those events. We distinguish between two attack strategies. As both of them
exploit temporal information in the system, they both fall into the category of
timing attacks.
The first strategy does not exploit the timestamps that are encoded into the
credentials. Instead, it exploits the behaviour of subjects in certain scenarios,
i.e. the high likelihood that a subject will show a credential to a verifier soon
after it was issued to them by an issuer. That is, if a credential is issued at time
τ and subsequently shown at time τ + τδ, where τδ is small, then the issuer and
verifier could collude to learn (with high probability) that the two pseudonyms
involved belong to the same subject. Of course, the meaning of ‘small’ here will
depend on the application, in particular on the rate of credential issuing. As a
result, this timing attack is not equally serious in all scenarios. While in some
applications (e.g. driving licences) it may not be a concern at all, in others (e.g.
tickets, electronic cash, authentication tokens) the threat may be much more
significant.
The second strategy is essentially the one already mentioned in section 3
above, namely the correlation of issuing and showing events based on the type of
the credentials involved, and thereby linking the associated pseudonyms. How-
ever, the fact that we are now assuming that credentials encode timestamps
(whose freshness is checked by verifiers), guarantees that credentials issued in
different periods are of different types. Exploiting this particular fact may render
the generic correlating-by-type attack much more dangerous.
5 Countermeasures
An obvious countermeasure to the first attack strategy is to require subjects
to wait between obtaining and showing a credential. However, this needs to be
managed carefully, since simply imposing some fixed waiting time, say τw, does
not really reduce the exposure to the attack. This is because correlation between
issuing and showing of credentials can still be performed by pairing these events
if they are separated by a time difference of a little over τw. Thus, the delay τw
should be randomised in some way. This, however, raises new questions: what
are the minimum and maximum acceptable values for τw, given that it is likely
(if not certain) to affect the system’s usability? How does the choice of these
limits affect unlinkability? How does the probability distribution according to
which τw is drawn affect unlinkability?
The second attack scenario requires slightly different countermeasures. The
objective here is to require subjects not to show credentials of some type until
sufficiently many credentials of that type have been issued (to other subjects).
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tween the issuing and showing of credentials. The requirement by verifiers to
validate the timestamps of credentials, however, introduces an additional con-
straint, namely that, at the time of showing, credentials should not have expired.
We now describe a simple heuristic that, using random delays, tries to ap-
proach a reasonable compromise between usability, security and privacy in the
face of the above timing attacks. It requires issuers to generate credentials in
batches, containing a range of consecutive issue timestamps. More precisely,
suppose a subject requests an issuer to provide a credential encoding a certain
set of attributes α. Instead of issuing a single credential with type defined by the
concatenation of α with the current timestamp nτi, the issuer generates a set of
k credentials with types defined by the concatenation of α with the timestamps
(n− j)τi, where 0 ≤ j ≤ k− 1, where k is a policy-based parameter (which may
be chosen by the subject or by the issuer, depending on the system context).
This means, of course, that timestamps no longer precisely encode the time
of issue; it is assumed, however, that this does not affect security since those
credentials with ‘old’ timestamps are bound to expire sooner than those with
current ones. It is also required that subjects maintain a loosely synchronised
clock, such that they can distinguish time periods. Further, it is assumed that
verifiers accept credentials that were issued during the k most recent periods
(including the current one).
With respect credential showing, the subject must follow a two stage process.
Note that we suppose that the set of k credentials were actually issued at time
τis, where nτi ≤ τis < (n+ 1)τi.
1. The subject is not permitted to show any of the issued credentials until
a randomised waiting time τw has elapsed, where τmin ≤ τw ≤ τmax, and
τmin and τmax are domain specific parameters. Clearly τmin will depend on
the rate of credential issue and showing, and should be chosen to prevent
simple correlation between credential issue and showing. Further, τmax must
satisfy τmax < (n + k)τi − τis, since otherwise all the credentials may have
expired before they can be used. In addition, τmax should be large enough
to sufficiently randomise the delay between issue and showing, but not so
large as to damage usability. The precise choices for both parameters will
be a sensitive issue, and these parameters can be subject-specific. Similarly,
the probability distribution to be used to randomly select the waiting time
could be varied, but it seems reasonable to use a uniform distribution.
2. The subject should then show the credential with the oldest timestamp which
is still valid (according to the policy of the verifier). That is, if we assume
that the credential is to be shown at time τsh (where τsh ≈ τis + τw), then
the subject should show the credential with timestamp (bτsh/τic − k+ 1)τi.
Observing that nτi ≤ τis and that 0 ≤ τw < (n + k)τi − τis, we have
n ≤ τsh/τi < (n+k) and hence n ≤ bτsh/τic ≤ n+k−1. Thus (n−k+1)τi ≤
(bτsh/τic − k + 1)τi ≤ nτi, and hence such a credential exists within the set
of credentials that was issued to the subject.
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Figure 1 illustrates the operation of the heuristic for the case k = 2, i.e. in
the case where the verifier accepts credentials that were issued during the last
two periods (this amount of time is denoted τacc in the figure). At time τis the
subject obtains two credentials: c1 and c2, where c1 contains timestamp nτi and
c2 contains timestamp (n − 1)τi. A random waiting time tw is then selected.
In case (a) the waiting time is such that τsh falls within the next period, so
credential c1 is shown (c2 has expired). In case (b) τsh falls within the same
period, so the ‘older’ credential c2 is shown.
The limit τmin should be selected such that, in every time period of that
length, the expected number of subjects obtaining credentials of the type in
question is sufficiently large. Imposing this lower limit is necessary because oth-
erwise organisations may unambiguously link of a pair of showing and issuing
events whenever some subject selects a waiting time no more than τmin.
In some applications it may be unacceptable for a subject to obtain k creden-
tials instead of one. A simple variation of the above heuristic does not require
the subject to obtain k credentials. This involves simply choosing the waiting
time τw first, and then only obtaining the credential that is appropriate to be
shown at time τis + τw. This variation, however, offers significantly less protec-
tion against attacks based on correlation of credential types, since the number
of issued credentials drops by a factor of k.
There are trade-offs between the choices for k and τi. If τi is relatively large
then k can be made smaller, saving work in credential issue and storage. However,
choosing a large value for τi also has disadvantages; in particular it decreases
the precision available for specifying lifetimes of credentials, bearing in mind
that choices for k may vary across the populations of users and organisations
(depending on their privacy requirements).
We note that some cryptographic constructions allow for zero-knowledge
proofs of the fact that some variable lies within a certain range, without re-
vealing its value. Anonymous credential systems that make use of such con-
structions (see, for example, [1]) may overcome the timing attacks introduced
8by timestamps, since subjects can convince verifiers that timestamps lie within
some acceptable range, without revealing any information beyond this fact. In
order to maximise unlinkability in this scenario, however, this range has to be
selected carefully. Assuming that timestamps encode the time of issue, the lower
limit of the range should indicate ‘just before expiry’, i.e. the subject should
prove that the issue timestamp is at least τsh− τacc, where τacc denotes the time
after which credentials expire (according to the policy of the verifier).
6 Concluding remarks
Timing issues often arise in the context of privacy preserving schemes. One
proposed solution to the problem of anonymous communications is mix net-
works [5, 9]. A mix network enables senders to send messages to recipients in a
way that preserves the anonymity of the sender. A cascade of trusted parties,
called ‘mixes’, provides the anonymising service, i.e. it hides the identities of the
senders from the recipients. Each mix is susceptible to timing attacks that try
to correlate incoming and outgoing messages. A typical countermeasure requires
the mix to wait for a number of incoming messages before forwarding them (in
shuﬄed order) to the next mix in the cascade (or, in the case of the final mix,
to the recipient of the message).
Mix networks rely on trusted parties. Unfortunately, such entities do not
exist in anonymous credential systems. In fact, in many scenarios, relying on
third parties may be undesirable. In this paper we outlined some heuristics that
offer protection against timing attacks, in the context of anonymous credentials.
Although they do not rely on a trusted third party, they come with a cost in
terms of communication and computational overhead and a potential impact on
usability.
Clearly, more work is needed to devise optimal solutions which address the
threat of timing attacks on anonymous credentials. These solutions should min-
imise three, probably contradicting, requirements: the probability of pseudonym
linking, the inconvenience introduced to subjects, and the impact on system se-
curity. In other words, they should offer reasonable tradeoffs between usability,
security and privacy protection – a non-trivial task indeed.
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